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EVERYTHING BOILS
DOWN TO ONE CORE
QUESTION: WILL THE
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
BE ABLE TO STABILISE
THE POLITICAL 
LANDSCAPE OR WILL 
THE COUNTRY ONCE
AGAIN FALL INTO THE
TRAP OF YET ANOTHER 
CIVIL WAR?
Can it muddle through?
Some thoughts on future scenarios for Afghanistan
fter 11 years of inter-
vention by the
US/NATO in
Afghanistan helping to cre-
ate a stable and prosperous
country, the socio-political
and economic future for the
Afghans still remains a
conundrum. The aim here,
however is not to predict one,
two or even more certain,
self-fulfilling future scenar-
ios. It is also not an attempt
to lay out where Afghanistan
should go. The goal of this
article is to share ideas about
visions for the country’s and
its people’s future. Today,
there are several indications
that everything boils down
to one core question: Will the
Afghan government be able
to stabilise the political land-
scape or will the country
once again fall into the trap
of yet another civil war?
Having this in mind, three
scenarios could evolve: A
‘muddling through’ scenario
of the current and successive
governments, a coup sce-
nario and a civil war sce-
nario. Actually it is likely that
the coup scenario will lead
to a civil war situation in the
middle or long term per-
spective. It is nevertheless
worth examining each of
these different potential out-
comes separately. 
For the ‘muddling through’
scenario, following condi-
tions must be fulfilled. First,
this scenario can only be
deemed realistic if there is a
certain sense of conviction
among all Afghan actors
involved that the last three
decades of armed conflict
were self-destructive.
Building on the notion that
continuing down this path
of wasting resources and
diminishing indigenous
power would lead to a weak-
ening of the position of sev-
eral factions in their respec-
tive regional strongholds, is
of paramount importance to
the “muddling through” case.
In order to preserve the sen-
timent of “wasteful fighting”,
it is of utmost importance to
find clear and acceptable
mechanisms of granting
access to central political
decision-making processes
as well as the distribution of
national resources. 
A second crucial condition
is accepting that the Taliban
movement will have to be
allowed to play a role in the
Afghan state and society. The
acknowledgement of these
conditions by the new
National Front of
Afghanistan (NF, formed at
the end of 2011 to political-
ly oppose President Hamid
Karzai) as well as the assent
of numerous local militias-
set up by the US/NATO,
instructed to fight the Taliban
is the precursor of establish-
ing the foundation for the
“muddling through” secnario
The ‘Berlin statement’ in
January 2012 of the three
founders of the NF, ‘former’
warlords Ahmad Zia Massud
(Tajik, Jamiat-e Islami),
General Abdul Rashid
Dostum (Uzbek, Jombesh
party) and Muhammad
Muhaqqui (Hazara, Hezb-e
Wahdat), stating  that in prin-
cipal they could conceive of
leading negotiations  with
the Taliban as long as the NF
would be included in the
talks, might be an indication
of the possibility of an
arrangement. If the NF con-
tinues to feel excluded from
the ‘Taliban dialogue’, the
absence of large scale armed
confrontations as a main
characteristic of this scenario
will not be guaranteed.
The acceptance of the
‘Taliban presence’ could
basically appear in a formal
or informal power-sharing
arrangement. Formal power
sharing aims to make a legit-
imate political participation
for the Taliban possible, like
allowing official representa-
tives such as political groups
to take part in the country’s
politics. But a ‘too generous’
concession which would
integrate the Taliban imme-
diately into the institutional
structure of the country’s
political-administrative sys-
tem, for example in form of
quotas or reserved domains,
would overstretch the incen-
tive/will for rapprochement
of the former and current
combatants of the Taliban.
Furthermore, it is hard to
envision how the Taliban
would fit into the current
Realpolitik of Kabul’s clien-
telistic and corrupt policy
making and implementation
without undermining the
Taliban’s own ideological
principals. Nevertheless, in
order to implement a formal
integration of the Taliban,
they have to abandon the
notion of regaining total
power (re-establishing their
Islamic Emirate), accept the
constitution, i.e. distancing
themselves from radical
visions of organising social
and public life, as well as seri-
ously integrate themselves
into a growing vibrant and
pluralistic civil society. Their
detachment from Al-Qaida,
of course is another essen-
tial criteria. However, the
ongoing massive human
rights violations, especially
violence against women, in
currently Taliban-controlled
areas (which the Taliban
most likely will still hold after
a formal arrangement), indi-
cates that they are not inter-
ested in giving up their
extremist worldviews.
However, all kinds of formal
arrangements remain high-
ly fragile since it will be dif-
ficult to balance the ambi-
tions for power as well as
control the deep anger
among the different factions.
Therefore, the Taliban’s
acceptance of a certain level
of US troops in the country,
to ensure minimum securi-
ty for the central government
and its institutions, is crucial
which of course counts for
all other Afghan parties as
well. 
In contrast, an informal
power-sharing agreement
seems to be more realistic.
The Taliban leadership has
become convinced that they
will not able to re-capture
Kabul and other urban cen-
tres due to the continuing US
military presence (and other,
smaller NATO contingents),
the rising strength of ‘con-
tracted’ local militias, and
loyal Afghan Security Forces
(which have been able to
maintain internal cohesion
and a clear chain of com-
mand) beyond 2014. The
Taliban will, however, take
control over certain rural
areas, establishing their own
regional administration, but
will not try to extend their
influence over the borders of
certain, negotiated areas. In
return, the government and
the militias will tolerate
Taliban dominance in the
respective regions in order
to maintain territorial
integrity of the state and to
avoid civil war. But one has
to be aware that such a form
of power-sharing determines
a dramatic set-back for the
development of a free civil
society. In fact, for the peo-
ple in the affected areas, it
will be a return to square one,
meaning a ‘quasi-come-
back’ of the conditions under
the last Taliban regime (1996-
2001). 
However, regardless of the
kind of agreement which will
be achieved, there is the con-
stant threat that some
Taliban groups will not be
eager to drop their swords
and pick up ploughshares
Even if they cannot win, they
will at least try to destabilise
the central government and
as many provinces or dis-
tricts as possible. Therefore,
the successful re-formation
of (former) anti-Taliban
groups of the Hazaras,
Uzbeks, and Tadjiks as well
as the militias will keep a
close eye on the Pashtun-
dominated Taliban. But they
will not only try to keep them
in check in order to protect
their resources, some will go
further and seek excuses for
revenge. In other words, the
fighting will most likely con-
tinue with varying intensity.
Third, countries in the
direct as well as extended
neighbourhood will play a
constructive role in achiev-
ing a stable and sustainable
balance of power between all
Afghan factions which must
be seen as the key for peace.
The three-way summit
between Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, which occurred
in February 2012, could have
the potential to serve as a
platform to build trust, coor-
dinate interests as well as
ensure Afghanistan’s sover-
eignty. As a main building
block towards comprehen-
sive regional interlocutions,
this trilateral dialogue could
be broadened in a second
step, including India and
China. In a third round,
Russia and the Central Asian
Republics, namely Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
could add their contribu-
tions for sustainable negoti-
ations. However, it is obvious
that these nations must set-
tle or at least ‘freeze’ their
multi-layered and complex
bilateral and triangular con-
flict constellations for the
sake of a fruitful exchange of
views. In this direction, the
‘composite dialogue’
between India and Pakistan
could serve as a model, and
all participating countries
could be convinced of the
merits of cooperation, New
Delhi and Islamabad agreed
to broaden the single-issue-
oriented bilateralism which
was centered on the Kashmir
stalemate. But most impor-
tantly, this process has to be
facilitated by and within the
region to gain credibility.
Therefore, mediation from
outside the region might be
more a roadblock than a cat-
alyst for change, at least at
the initial stage. If needed
and demanded and based
upon a regional consensus,
the states of the European
Union (EU) and ASEAN
should showcase their expe-
ditious experiences in
enhancing regional cooper-
ation.
In consequence, if the
above-mentioned determi-
nants would work in favour
of national reconciliation,
the ‘muddling-through’ sce-
nario of the Afghan state
might appear in two varia-
tions: On the one hand, as a
state with a pro forma cen-
tral administration just for
the sake of having a nation-
al government. Officially
Kabul obtains full control
over the state of affairs, as
outlined in a more or less
insignificant constitution.
But regarding the reality on
the ground the government
would primarily represent
the state outwards in order
‘to keep the aid flowing’.
Regarding inwards, the
administration would only
perform ceremonially with
minimal domestic functions,
exercising purely symbolic
power.
On the other hand, the
Afghan state could appear
with a ‘sufficient enough’
government with relatively
functional institutions,
enabling the executive to jug-
gle the different regional
power centres in order to bal-
ance the interests between
central and regional as well
as between the regional cen-
tres themselves. In other
words, the government
would be able to influence
and control the political deci-
sion-making processes. Last
but not least, one should
mention that in both sce-
narios, elections do not play
a significant role for political
elite recruitment, because
regional and ethnic ties will
lead to an electoral behavior
characterized by so-called
vote banks, representing the
respective realm of influ-
ences of the power centers. 
The coup situation more
or less resembles a hybrid sit-
uation of the ‘muddling-
through’ and civil war sce-
narios. Basically there will be
a permanent threat of a coup
d’état, which is not an
unknown phenomenon in
Afghanistan. The country
already experienced a cou-
ple of military-led or backed
or enforced regime changes
in the last six decades. The
most crucial ones were the
ousting of King Zahir Shar in
1973 by Doud Khan or the
killing of Khan later on by
revolting officers in 1978
(Saur Revolution), leading to
the installation of the first
communist government in
the country. Several critical
junctures can be identified
which could create the
momentum for such coups:
First, if the civilian govern-
ment is not able to achieve
or keep the ethnic balance
within the Afghan National
Army and meanwhile, one
ethnic group like the Tajiks
or Pashtuns gains an upper
hand in the officers corps
and/or rank and file. Second,
if the government is forced
to significantly reduce troop
levels due insufficient finan-
cial resources. 
Third, the remaining US
troops fail to monitor and
intervene in Afghan power
struggles in order to protect
the government. Fourth, if
there is a deterioration in
military internal cohesion,
parts of the military will
stand up against the gov-
ernment, and eventually
gain support by outside
forces as happened during
the Saur revolution. Fifth, if
President Hamid Karzai is
able to lift the ban on run-
ning for a third term and
remain in office after 2014
through (extra-) constitu-
tional engineering. This last
factor will gain particular
momentum if widespread
irregularities during the next
presidential election appear,
diminishing the chances for
the potential candidate of the
National Front of
Afghanistan. 
There is no doubt that a
coup would be a significant
game changer in the com-
plex and fragile balance of
power in the country, either
disturbing or re-establishing
it. However, despite the fact
that there might be a slight,
modicum of hope that all
major actors will accept an
enforced regime change, due
to their respective own dis-
agreements with the nation-
al government, they will not
accept the dominance of one
certain faction or coalition
in the country. In conse-
quence, the coup will lead to
the abyss of civil war again.
Although a muddling- sce-
nario of the Afghan govern-
ment is far from being a best
case scenario, the fall into the
abyss of civil war is doubt-
less the worst case scenario.
It will not only lead to a col-
lapse of the national gov-
ernment and its institution-
al structure; but would mark
a return to the large-scale
armed confrontation
between the different
Mujahideen factions of the
pre-Taliban area. In this con-
text, one has to state that the
civil war during these days
was perhaps suspended but
never really settled, neither
by the Taliban nor by the
multinational International
Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) or the US-led coali-
tion force. But in case of
resuming the war, it will be
of a much higher intensity
due to more combatants,
guns and resources, and
there will be more actors
which have much more to
lose than ever before.
However, today it seems that
the calculated optimism of
the international communi-
ty regarding a muddling-
through scenario in
Afghanistan with its complex
challenges still offers some
justified hope that in the end,
things will work out.
Nevertheless one should not
ignore that Afghanistan is in
a state of flux, unfortunate-
ly not necessarily heading
towards a peaceful future.
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New Historicism and analysis of literary texts
TASNEEM TAYEB KABIR
he quality of a text can
be judged to a great
extent by examining it
in the light of its social, eco-
nomic and historical con-
texts, because a text encap-
sulates the spirit of the age
in which it is written. For
instance, texts such as
Daniel Defoe’s Robinson
Crusoe represent the
essence of the contexts and
as a result it is very essential
to consider contemporary
contextual information
while explaining the effec-
tiveness of texts. New
Historicism is a modern crit-
ical approach which advo-
cates the consideration of
contextual information, like
social or political informa-
tion, while examining the
success or quality of a text.
According to the New
Historicists historical infor-
mation play a vital in the
understanding of a text and
it is very essential to read the
co-texts along with the lit-
erary text to fully compre-
hend its meaning.
According to some New
Historical critics the mean-
ing of a text is engraved in
the socio-political setting in
which it is written and with-
out referring to the social or
historical information it is
not possible to fully evalu-
ate or explain the success of
a text, as Raman Selden,
Peter Widdowson and Peter
Brooker in their book A
Reader’s Guide to
Contemporary Literary
Theory  write that accord-
ing to Levinson, New
Historicism uses the “‘his-
torical imagination’ to
restore to a literary work
those contemporary mean-
ings which inscribe the
matrix in which it is shaped”. 
It is also essential to con-
sider the social, historical or
even economic information
while appraising the quali-
ty of a text in order to see
which contemporary issues
the text addresses. 
It is usually believed that
a text highlights contempo-
rary issues such as the socio-
economic condition of the
time in which it is written,
and as a result it is impor-
tant to judge to quality of a
text by looking at the con-
temporary situation from
which it arises. For instance,
according to Montrose,
Shakespeare’s A
Midsummer Night’s Dream
is not simply a comedy
about love and marriage;
rather by proclaiming the
male power of the patriar-
chal society in this play,
Shakespeare tries to “sym-
bolically” restore the bal-
ance of power between men
and women in England
which was at that time ruled
by Queen Elizabeth I, a
female monarch, as
Montrose comments,
“Shakespeare’s comedy
symbolically neutralizes the
royal power to which it
ostensibly pays homage”. 
In addition, judging a text
by isolating it from its his-
torical or social context, as
suggested by the New
Critics, limits the scope of
interpretation, as the mean-
ing of a text cannot be fully
understood by merely look-
ing at the words on the
pages. As a result, the Hew
Historicists suggest that a
literary text should be stud-
ied in relation to the other
contemporary non-literary
texts, as according to them,
“The text and the co-text
used will be seen as expres-
sion of the same historical
moment, and interpreted
accordingly”. New
Historicists, like the New
Critics, suggest close-read-
ing of a literary text and at
the same time also advocate
close reading of the con-
temporary non-literary
texts, so that the inter-rela-
tionship between the text
and the co-texts are
revealed, which can facili-
tate new interpretations of
the literary text being ana-
lyzed. 
Social, economic and his-
torical, all these contexts are
very useful in this kind of
studies and all these prop-
erties play a major role in
shaping a literary text of a
time. 
However, the importance
of these properties depends
on the specific literary texts
under scrutiny and the con-
temporary issues which they
focus on. 
For instance while ana-
lyzing Jane Austen’s novels,
like Sense and Sensibility
one can give more empha-
sis on socio-economic infor-
mation of the time, as this
novel deals with the social
views about marriage, posi-
tion of women in society
and the influence of money
on personal relationships
and social status.
However, while studying
Dryden’s Absalom and
Achitophel one must focus
more on the political situa-
tion of the Restoration era,
as this poem is a political
satire, in which Dryden uses
the Biblical story of
Absalom’s revolt against his
father King David of Israel,
to present the unstable
political situation which
prevailed in England during
the rule of King Charles II.   
It is essential to consider
the social, political, eco-
nomic and historical con-
texts while analyzing the
quality and success of a text
as the meaning of a literary
text cannot be fully com-
prehended without analyz-
ing it in the light of the con-
temporary co-texts.
However, the appropriate-
ness and relevance of the
properties depend on the
contemporary issues which
the literary text addresses.  
